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This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax
schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences
over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable
income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance
investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the
same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.
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1 Introduction
A standard result in the literature on collective choice over redistributive policies is
that political conﬂict is a mirror image of earned income. Individuals with a high
income favor low taxes, while those with a low income favor high taxes, and the
median income earner is decisive in a majority rule election. However, if money can
be used to avoid taxation, this is no longer self-evident since earned income is no
longer necessarily the same as taxable income.
This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over linear income
tax schedules studied in Roberts (1977). Here, heterogenous individuals face a joint
decision on how much to work and how much of the earned, pre-tax income to
spend on avoiding taxation. Tax avoidance activities have a general form, and can
be considered as all costly actions taken by an individual with the sole purpose of
reducing his tax burden.1
As in Roberts’ article, the main concern is the existence of a majority voting equi-
librium. Using the single-crossing condition developed in Gans and Smart (1996), it
will be shown that a majority voting equilibrium exists if taxable income, rather than
labor income, is order restricted. The relation between the ordering of labor income
and that of taxable income turns out to depend on the tax avoidance opportunities.
As will be shown, a technical condition on the avoidance possibilities can ensure
that they are the same, but there are also situations where these orderings are never
the same, and those with the highest labor income pay no taxes in equilibrium.2
The paper connects two strands of the literature. On the one hand, following
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), much of the liter-
ature on voting over income tax schedules has focused on the interaction between
labor supply and majority rule. On the other hand, many have pointed out that tax
avoidance responses are at least as important as changes in labor supply, leading
1Tax avoidance is usually deﬁned as all legal measures taken to reduce taxes without altering
real variables (see e.g. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001)). Here the focus is not on the legal aspect
of the activity, but rather on all aspects which can be modeled as choices under certainty, (for
example, costly, illegal tax evasion with a zero probability of detection).
2That such a situation can indeed be a political equilibrium is shown in Roine (2002).3
to studies of the interaction between labor supply and tax avoidance (e.g. Mayshar
(1991) and Agell and Persson (2000)).3 In this paper, labor supply, tax avoidance,
and the majority-rule determination of the tax/transfer scheme are present simul-
taneously.
2 The model
Consider a situation with n individuals, who have preferences over two goods, con-
sumption c and leisure l. Every individual has a time endowment of one unit, which
can be divided between work y (that pays a wage normalized to 1) and leisure
l =1− y.
It is assumed that preferences can be represented by a diﬀerentiable utility func-
tion u(c,l;α), with uc > 0 and ul < 0, where α is an index representing an individual
characteristic (e.g., ability or preference for work).
Individuals are to collectively decide on a tax schedule, which consists of a lump-
sum transfer, T ∈ <, received by everyone, and a proportional tax rate t ∈ [0,1]
on labor income y.4 However, individuals can avoid paying a share of their tax
through investing in tax avoidance. More precisely, an investment, A ∈ <, reduces
the tax-payment by a factor δ(A) ∈ [0,1], since individuals investing in avoidance
only pay δ(A)ty, instead of ty, in taxes.
Tax avoidance possibilities, described by the function δ(A), are assumed to be
such that larger avoidance investments lead to smaller actual tax payments, but
with diminishing returns, i.e., δ
0(A) < 0 and δ
00(A) > 0. Furthermore, δ(0) = 1
and limA→∞ δ(A) ≥ 0. That is, making no investment in tax avoidance gives no
reduction, and complete avoidance is not possible.
An individual’s consumption is given by
c =( 1− δ(A)t)y + T − A, (1)
3Examples of studies ranking diﬀerent responses to taxation are Slemrod (1992) and Auerbach
and Slemrod (1997).
4Note that it is not necessary to assume a balanced budget. T c a nb ea n yr e a li nt h es p a c eo f
possible tax/transfer schemes, [0,1] ×< .4
and an individual’s problem, given any tax/transfer scheme (t,T), is to
max
A≥0,y>0
u((1 − δ(A)t)y + T − A,1 − y;α) . (2)




0(A)ty − 1) ≤ 0 .
Noting that the second-order condition holds, since δ
00(A) > 0, the optimal invest-
ment in tax avoidance A∗ is given by
A
∗ =m a x{0,A} ,






The corner solution A =0is relevant whenever y and t are such that 1
ty > −δ
0(0),
that is, when an individual’s tax payment is so small that it does not pay to invest
in tax avoidance at all. The interpretation of (3) is that the optimal tax avoidance
investment A∗ is increasing in labor income y and the tax rate t (lower values of
−δ
0(A∗) are associated with higher values of A∗). Furthermore, it shows that there
is an income level
˜ y = −1/δ
0(0)t ,( 4 )
such that those with a lower income (y<˜ y) do not invest in tax avoidance, while
those with a higher income (y>˜ y) do.











] − ul ≤ 0 ,
with equality if y is positive. Using that −δ
0(A∗)= 1
ty for optimal tax avoidance
decisions gives that optimal labor supply y∗ is implicitly given by
uc(1 − δ(A
∗)t) − ul =0. (5)5
Compared to the standard expression, uc(1 − t) − ul =0(which gives the labor
supply for those who do not avoid taxes, since δ(0) = 1) t h et a xw e d g ei sn o w
altered by a factor δ(A∗), due to the optimal tax avoidance investment.5




∗ + T − A
∗,1 − y
∗;α) , (6)
where A∗ and y∗ satisfy (3) and (5) for those avoiding taxes, and where δ(A∗)=1if
A∗ =0 .6 As shown in Gans and Smart (1996), a suﬃcient condition for a majority
voting equilibrium to exist, is that the indirect utility function v(t,T,α) satisﬁes the
Spence-Mirrlees condition, that is, voters’ marginal rates of substitution between t





∂u((1 − δ(A∗)t)y∗ + T − A∗,1 − y∗;α)/∂t
∂u((1 − δ(A∗)t)y∗ + T − A∗,1 − y∗;α)/∂T
,







Hence, the slope of an individual’s indiﬀerence curve in the space of all possible tax
schedules is given by δ(A∗)y∗, that is, an individual’s taxable income. This implies
that the Spence-Mirrlees condition holds if and only if taxable income, δ(A∗)y∗, is
increasing in α.
Proposition 1 Suppose that majority rule is used to choose a tax schedule, consist-
ing of a lump-sum transfer and a proportional tax rate on labor income, and that
5Since y is not explicit in equation (5), it is not possible to solve for y∗, nor explicitly express
∂y/∂α. However, using (3), (5) and the total diﬀerential of (1), one can show that ∂y/∂α, ∂A/∂α,
and ∂c/∂α must always have the same sign. This means that if u(c,l;α) is such that ∂c/∂α is
always positive, so is ∂y/∂α.
6It should be noted that the envelope function v(·) is diﬀerentiable even if the optimal choice of
δ(A∗) is non-diﬀerentiable at the point ˜ y = −1/δ
0(0)t. The function is well deﬁned for those with
income y∗ < ˜ y where −
∂v/∂t
∂v/∂T = y∗, while it is −
∂v/∂t
∂v/∂T = δ(A∗)y∗ for those with income y∗ > ˜ y.
Since δ(A∗) → 1 as y → ˜ y from above, the left diﬀerentiable at ˜ y, (limy→˜ y−(y∗)) equals the right
diﬀerentiable at ˜ y (limy→˜ y+(δ(A∗)y∗), which means that the value function is also diﬀerentiable
at ˜ y. See, for example, Milgrom and Segal (2000).6
individuals have the possibility to invest in avoiding taxation. Then, a suﬃcient con-
dition for a majority-voting equilibrium to exist is that taxable income be increasing
in some invariant order of the voters for all possible tax schedules.
This result can be seen as a modiﬁed version of Proposition 1 in Gans and Smart
(1996). The diﬀerence is that in the presence of tax avoidance, it is not the order
of optimal labor supply, y∗ that is of importance but rather, the order of optimally
chosen taxable income, δ(A∗)y∗, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply
and tax avoidance. In the absence of avoidance possibilities the two are, of course,
always equal.
That the ordering of labor income (labor supply) is monotonically increasing
irrespective of the tax schedule is normally guaranteed under relatively mild con-
ditions. But this is not equally obvious in a setting with tax avoidance. In the
standard case, if the index α, ordering individuals by type, stands for higher abili-
ties or wage rates, then higher values of α are associated with higher labor income
under standard assumptions. However, in the presence of tax avoidance opportuni-
ties, higher labor income is also associated with larger investments in tax avoidance,
i.e., a higher value of y∗ means a lower value of δ(A∗). For the ordering of taxable
income δ(A∗)y∗ to remain equal to the ordering of labor income y∗, increases in y
must always dominate the decreasing eﬀect of δ(A), due to an increased avoidance
at higher incomes. This raises the obvious question of when these orderings are the
same, i.e. given some ordering of earned income y, when is the ordering of taxable
income δ(A∗)y the same? It turns out that a technical condition on the avoidance
function guarantees that the ordering remains unchanged.
Proposition 2 Assume that there is a ﬁxed ordering of labor income y over all
tax schedules and that a fraction δ(A) of taxes can be avoided at a cost A, where
δ
0(A) < 0 and δ
00(A) > 0. Then, taxable income δ(A∗)y has the same ordering over
all tax schedules, if the tax avoidance function δ(A) is such that log δ(A) is concave.
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Again, using that −δ
0(A∗)= 1












) ≤ 0 .
which holds if
d2
dA2 log(δ(A)) ≤ 0.
Hence, δ(A∗)y is increasing in y, if the logarithm of δ(A) is concave.
The interpretation of the log concavity requirement is that for a very convex
tax avoidance function, the optimal avoidance expenditure increases very fast with
income for some individuals at least for suﬃciently high tax rates. This implies that
the reported income of those individuals may fall with productivity, violating the
Spence-Mirrlees condition.7
7A number of tax avoidance functions fulﬁll the log concavity condition. For example, all
functions of the form δ(A)=e−nA (for positive A and n>0) and functions of the form δ(A)=
n−A (for positive A and n>1). One convex function which does not fulﬁll the condition is
δ(A)=1 /(1 + A)n, (for positive A and n).8
What is most important to note is perhaps not the precise condition that guar-
antees order-restriction but rather, the fact that the tax avoidance possibilities may
alter the preference ordering, even if there is a ﬁxed order of labor income. A situa-
tion where the potential consequences become particularly stark is when the returns
to tax avoidance are increasing rather than decreasing as assumed before, i.e. when
δ(A) is such that δ
0(A) < 0 and δ
00(A) < 0 instead of δ
00(A) > 0.O p t i m a l t a x
avoidance is still given by
max
A
u((1 − δ(A)t)y + T − A,1 − y;α)




0(A)ty − 1) ≤ 0,
as before. However, when δ
00(A) < 0, this means that the choice of A, which max-
imizes utility, is given by either of the corner solutions δ =1or δ =0 ,w i t ht h e
corresponding optimal tax avoidance investments, A =0or A = Amax. Figure 1
illustrates this fact. The left hand graph shows a convex avoidance function with
the interior solution to the optimization problem for an individual with income y at
tax rate t. Increases in t as well as in y cause the slope of the "indiﬀerence line" to
fall, implying that increases in the tax rate induce more avoidance investments and
that the richer an individual is the more he invests in avoidance. The right-hand
graph shows a situation where an individual with a lower income (y1) chooses to
invest nothing while the high income individual (y2) optimally invests Amax and,
consequently, pays no taxes.
This binary choice of either investing so as to completely avoid taxes, or not avoid
taxes at all, leads to a situation where preferences over tax schedules are never order
restricted over all possible tax schedules. A simple way of seeing why this is the case
is to consider a tax schedule (t,T) where t is suﬃciently close to zero for no one to
invest in tax avoidance. At this point, the taxable income of individuals is ordered
according to their labor income. But if, as t increases, at least the richest individual
starts investing in tax avoidance, this alters the ordering of taxable income. The9
richest individual, who has the highest taxable income before the investment, now
has a taxable income of zero.8 In contrast to Proposition 2, the following can now
be concluded:
Proposition 3 Assume that there is a ﬁxed ordering of labor income y over all tax
schedules. Then, taxable income δ(A∗)y never has the same ordering as y if the
tax avoidance function δ(A) is concave and, at least, one individual invests in tax
avoidance.
If a majority voting equilibrium exists in this situation, it will be one where the
rich (tax avoiders) and the poor favor an increase of the tax rate. The reason for this
unusual coalition is, of course, that the rich pay no taxes due to their investment in
tax avoidance.
3C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has considered the problem of majority voting over income-tax schedules
in the presence of tax avoidance. The ﬁrst key result is that when money can be
used to invest in activities that decrease the tax base, the preference ordering over
tax/transfer schemes is no longer given by earned, pre-tax income, but by taxable
income.A s u ﬃcient condition for a majority-voting equilibrium to exist in such
a setting is, hence, that taxable income be increasing in some invariant order of
the voters, for all possible tax schedules. The second key result concerns when the
ordering of earned income remains unchanged by the introduction of tax avoidance
possibilities. As has been shown the orderings are unchanged if the tax avoidance
function - as deﬁned in this paper - is log concave. This means that adding the
8Another way of showing the same thing would be to consider the indiﬀerence curves of individ-
uals in the space of all possible tax schedules [0,1]×<. In a range where neither of two individuals
invests in tax avoidance, the indiﬀerence curves of the richer individual are steeper and hence,
cross those of the individual with lower incomes from below. Given that at some point, the high
income individual chooses to completely avoid taxes, while the low income individual does not, the
indiﬀerence curves for the high income individual become ﬂat and will cross those of the individual
with low income again, this time from above. Hence, the indiﬀerence curves fail to satisfy the
single crossing property.10
possibility of avoiding taxes will not change the result of the median-voter theorem9
as long as the avoidance function is log concave.
Equally important, however, are the cases where this condition is not fulﬁlled,
since this can aﬀect the preference ordering of voters in sometimes surprising ways.
For example, tax avoidance opportunities that exhibit increasing returns to scale
induce behavior where the rich pay no taxes, only the avoidance cost, which in turn
means that they support any further increases in the tax rate. More generally, any
non-convexities in the tax avoidance function, such as ﬁxed costs, lead to a change
in the orderings of earned and taxable income.10 This implies that, just as tax
avoidance can alter the standard analysis of labor supply, it may also change the
view of redistributive politics. In particular, the political conﬂict over redistributive
taxes may no longer be between the rich and the poor.
9As formulated by Roberts (1977).
10Roine (2002) studies such a situation and shows how to solve for the political equilibrium, even
though the median-voter theorems do not apply in general.11
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Figure 1: Optimal tax avoidance for diﬀerent functional forms. To the left, a convex
function (δ
00 > 0), with an interior optimum and to the right a concave function
(δ
00 < 0), where only corner solutions can be optimal.